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Abstract  
Previous literature shows that income taxation significantly affects the behavior 
of high-income earners and business owners. However, it is still unclear how 
much of the response is due to changes in real economic activity, and how much 
is caused by tax avoidance. In this paper we distinguish between real responses 
and income-shifting between tax bases. We show that separating income-shifting 
responses can largely affect the welfare analysis of income taxation. In our 
empirical example we find that income-shifting accounts for a majority of the 
overall elasticity of taxable income among Finnish business owners and 
significantly decreases the marginal excess burden. 
 
Key words: elasticity of taxable income, tax avoidance, income-shifting, real 
responses 
JEL classification numbers: H24, H25, H32  
 
  
  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä artikkelissa tarkastellaan tuloverotuksen vaikutusta yrittäjien taloudellisiin 
päätöksiin. Aiemman tutkimuskirjallisuuden perusteella verotus vaikuttaa erityi-
sesti yrittäjien käyttäytymiseen. On kuitenkin epäselvää, kuinka suuri osuus 
käyttäytymisvaikutuksesta aiheutuu reaalitaloudellisista päätöksistä ja kuinka 
suuri osa johtuu verosuunnittelusta. Tämä erottelu on hyvin tärkeää, sillä eri 
käyttäytymiskanavat vaikuttavat siihen, miten verotuksen vaikutusta tulkitaan. 
Reaalitaloudelliset vaikutukset, kuten esimerkiksi muutokset yrityksen tuotan-
nossa ja yrittäjien kokonaistuloissa, vaikuttavat talouskasvuun ja yhteiskunnan 
hyvinvointiin. Sitä vastoin verosuunnittelu ei merkittävästi lisää taloudellista 
aktiviteettia. Verosuunnittelusta aiheutuvat vaikutukset rajoittuvat esimerkiksi 
yrityksen sisäisiin ratkaisuihin verorasituksen vähentämiseksi. Tämä vähentää 
kerättyjä verotuloja, muttei vaikuta reaalitaloudellisen toiminnan laajuuteen. 
Tässä artikkelissa erotellaan tuloverotuksen aiheuttamat reaaliset käyttäytymis-
vaikutukset verosuunnittelun vaikutuksista. Empiirisessä osiossa tutkimme 
suomalaisten listaamattomien osakeyhtiöiden omistajia. Näillä omistajayrittäjillä 
on merkittävät taloudelliset kannustimet järjestää yrityksestä nostamansa palkka- 
ja osinkotulot siten, että osinko- ja palkkatulosta maksettavat tuloverot ovat 
yhteensä mahdollisimman pienet. Tämä tulonmuunto palkka- ja osinkotulojen 
välillä on yksi keskeisimmistä verosuunnittelukanavista niille yrittäjille, jotka 
voivat nostaa yrityksestään sekä palkka- että osinkotuloja.  
Tulostemme perusteella yli kaksi kolmasosaa koko tuloverotuksen aiheuttamasta 
käyttäytymisvaikutuksesta on verosuunnittelua. Vaikka verotus aiheuttaa merkit-
täviä muutoksia yrittäjien tuloissa, valtaosa tästä muutoksesta on selitettävissä 
tulonmuuntona palkka- ja osinkotulojen välillä. On kuitenkin huomionarvoista, 
että tulostemme mukaan osinkoverotus vaikuttaa myös yrittäjien reaalitaloudel-
lisiin päätöksiin. Käyttäytymismuutokset eivät siis rajoitu pelkästään verosuun-
nitteluun ja osinkoverotuksella voidaan vaikuttaa kohtalaisesti myös yrittäjien 
kokonaistuloihin ja yrityksen tuotantoon.   
 
Asiasanat: Verosuunnittelu, tulonmuunto, reaaliset vaikutukset 
JEL-luokittelu: H24, H25, H32  
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1 Introduction
Income taxes are known to generate signiﬁcant behavioral eﬀects among high-income
earners and business owners. Previous literature concurs that the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI) is considerable for these individuals (see a comprehensive survey on ETI
by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2012). However, the interpretation of the overall behavioral
response is often diﬃcult because business owners and high-income earners have many
margins in which they can respond to taxes. In addition to real responses (labor supply,
eﬀort etc.), many tax systems include a range of opportunities to legally avoid taxes.
Although previous research shows that tax avoidance is a signiﬁcant behavioral margin
for these groups (see e.g. Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014), it is still unclear how much of
the overall response is due to changes in real economic activity, and how much is due to
avoidance.
Income-shifting is one of the most relevant tax avoidance channels for business owners
and high-income earners (see e.g. Gordon and Slemrod 2000, Goolsbee 2000, Kreiner et
al. 2014). Distinguishing between real responses and income-shifting between diﬀerent
tax bases is important because the nature of the response largely aﬀects the welfare
conclusions and policy recommendations (Slemrod 1995, Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva
2014). Traditionally, ETI quantiﬁes the excess burden of the income tax (Feldstein 1995,
1999). However, income-shifting between tax bases might overstate ETI as a measure of
welfare losses among high-income earners and business owners. Standard ETI does not
account for the fact that other tax bases might have positive tax rates. Thus income-
shifting is not a full deadweight loss if the shifted income is also taxed (Saez 2004).
In addition, it is plausible that income-shifting responses inﬂict smaller welfare losses
compared to similar real economic responses (Chetty 2009). This could further decrease
the evaluated excess burden, which further highlights the importance of separating real
responses and income-shifting.
Our main contribution to the literature is to distinguish between real responses and
income-shifting responses. Based on previous theoretical literature (e.g. Piketty et al.
2014), we present a model that enables us to empirically separate the income-shifting
response from the overall ETI. We compare the excess burden in the standard ETI
model with a model that distinguishes between income-shifting and real responses. We
illustrate that separating the income-shifting response can have a substantial eﬀect on
evaluated welfare loss and policy recommendations.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to explicitly estimate both real elasticity and
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income-shifting between diﬀerent tax bases using a well-deﬁned empirical model, and
individual-level panel data and tax reforms. In our empirical example, we estimate both
real responses and income-shifting responses for the owners of privately held corporations
in Finland. This group faces large incentives and ample possibilities to shift income
between diﬀerent tax bases, which makes them a particularly suitable group for analyzing
both income-shifting and real responses. In the Finnish tax system, the owners of
privately held corporations can withdraw income from their ﬁrm as a combination of
wages and dividends, which are taxed with separate tax rate schedules and tax rules.
There are only a few minor legal limitations on whether income is withdrawn as wages
or dividends, and explicit tax rate diﬀerences induce clear incentives for tax-motivated
income-shifting.
We use extensive panel data of all Finnish business owners. We link ﬁrm-level tax
record information to the owner-level personal tax data, which is a novelty in the ETI
literature. With this data set we are able to richly control for ﬁrm-level characteristics
that might aﬀect the personal income trends of the owners. The comprehensive data
along with the dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland creates an interesting opportunity
to study the role of both income-shifting and real income creation. In general, the reform
tightened dividend taxation. However, the reform changed dividend tax rates diﬀerently
for diﬀerent types of owners, which provides suitable identifying variation to estimate
ETI among Finnish business owners.
Our results show that income-shifting responses are highly signiﬁcant both statisti-
cally and economically. Income-shifting responses account for a majority of the overall
response among Finnish business owners. Furthermore, we show compelling graphical
evidence that tax incentives induce clear behavioral responses, and that income-shifting
eﬀects are apparent. In addition, income trends are parallel in a group that faced a div-
idend tax increase and a group that faced no changes or a small dividend tax decrease
before the reform of 2005. This highlights that the typical threats to identiﬁcation in
ETI estimation stemming from non-tax-related changes in income are not a particular
issue in our empirical example.
Applying the estimated elasticities of income-shifting and real responses, we show
that separating the income-shifting response largely aﬀects the extent of the excess
burden among Finnish business owners. For example, the marginal excess burden of
dividend taxes decreases from 0.9 to 0.4 when we account for the fact that the shifted
income is also taxed. If we assume that income-shifting responses do not induce welfare
eﬀects the estimate further decreases to 0.3. These imply that large observed overall
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ETI does not necessarily indicate substantial welfare losses.
Our paper relates to the emerging literature on the composition of behavioral re-
sponses to tax rate changes. Piketty et al. (2014) formulate a theoretical framework for
analyzing tax avoidance eﬀects as a part of the ETI of high-income earners. By distin-
guishing between diﬀerent forms of behavioral responses (tax avoidance, real responses
and bargaining channels), they study the implications of optimal income taxation at
the upper end of the income distribution. They also provide empirical cross-country
evidence which indicates that both the real and avoidance responses are small while
bargaining eﬀects dominate. le Maire and Schjerning (2013) and Kreiner, Leth-Petersen
and Skov (2015, 2014) show that intertemporal income-shifting accounts for a signiﬁ-
cant share of the observed short-run ETI among self-employed and top income earners
in Denmark. These results imply that changes in real economic activity are small or
close to zero even though the observed overall ETI is signiﬁcant, especially among the
self-employed.
In addition, other previous studies from diﬀerent countries indicate that income-
shifting between tax bases is substantial for high-income earners and business owners.
For example, Gordon and Slemrod (2000) show evidence of active income-shifting be-
tween corporate and personal tax bases in the US. Devereux et al. (2014) show that
income-shifting between corporate and personal tax bases is also active in the UK. In
addition, Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) ﬁnd signiﬁcant income-shifting responses for
partners in partnership ﬁrms in India, and Romanov (2006) ﬁnds income-shifting be-
tween personal and corporate tax bases among high-income self-employed professionals
in Israel. In Sweden, Alstadsæter and Jacob (2012) show that income-shifting is active
among Swedish corporate owners. In Finland, Harju and Matikka (2014) show that
absent any real eﬀects, income-shifting between tax bases is active among the main
owners of privately held corporations in Finland. Also, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) show
that entrepreneurs and business owners increased their relative share of capital income
when capital income tax rates were decreased.
Finally, recent literature has identiﬁed ETI using income distributions around the
discontinuous kink points of the marginal income tax rate schedule. Saez (2010) shows
that excess bunching around kink points is proportional to the local ETI at the kink.
Many studies show that the excess mass around kink points is particularly large for self-
employed individuals (see Saez 2010, le Maire and Schjerning 2013, Chetty et al. 2011,
Bastani and Selin 2014). As an additional analysis, we estimate the local tax respon-
siveness of Finnish business owners using the bunching method. We ﬁnd that business
3
owners bunch actively at the dividend income tax rate kink point, which supports our
main results.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework.
Section 3 describes the Finnish income tax system and recent tax reforms. Section 4
discusses empirical estimation and identiﬁcation issues, introduces the data and presents
the descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the main results, alternative speciﬁcations
and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the main ﬁndings and implications.
2 Conceptual framework
2.1 Standard ETI model
We begin with the standard elasticity of taxable income (ETI) model with a single tax
base. Following Piketty et al. (2014), we assume a quasi-linear utility function of the
form ui(c, z) = c−hi(z), where c is consumption, z is taxable income, and hi(z) denotes
the cost of eﬀort to produce income for individual i. The cost function is assumed
to be convex and increasing in z. Utility is maximized under the budget constraint
c = z(1− τ) +R, where (1− τ) is the net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal tax rate)
on a linear segment of a non-linear tax rate schedule. R denotes virtual income.
Optimization of the utility function with respect to the budget constraint results in
individuals producing taxable income up to the point where h′i(z) = (1 − τ). Thus in
the absence of income eﬀects, individual taxable income supply is a function of (1− τ).
Next, consider a marginal change in the net-of-tax rate, d(1−τ). Then the elasticity
of taxable income can be written as
ez =
(1− τ)
z
dz
d(1− τ) (1)
where ez is the average ETI. In addition to changes in labor supply, ez covers changes
in, for example, work eﬀort and productivity. In addition, the average ETI covers tax
avoidance and tax evasion.
The intuition behind the standard ETI model is that all behavioral responses aﬀect
the excess burden of income taxation (Feldstein 1999). Individuals increase z until its
marginal cost equals the tax rate, and thus the overall ineﬃciency can be summarized
with ETI. In other words, h′i(z) = (1 − τ) no matter how z is adjusted, and thus
estimating ez is all we need for welfare analysis.
A usual approach to empirically estimate ETI with individual-level panel data and
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tax reforms is to use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach and a ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimator.
This method allows time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics that aﬀect in-
come growth to be canceled out. This is appealing as these characteristics (for example,
innate ability) are correlated with the progressive marginal tax rate.
Following Saez et al. (2012), the standard empirical ETI equation can be character-
ized as
4ln(z)t,i = ez4ln(1− τ)t,i +4ln(η)t,i +4ln(ε)t,i (2)
where t is a subscript for time and i denotes the individual, and 4 denotes the diﬀerence
between time t+k and t. z denotes taxable income, (1−τ) is the net-of-tax rate, and ez is
the average overall elasticity of taxable income. η denotes potential income, i.e. income
without taxes, and ε is the error term, including the transitory income component.
Many issues need to be taken into account when empirically estimating equation
(2). First, we need exogenous variation for 4ln(1 − τ)t,i to identify ETI. Second, the
net-of-tax rate and the transitory income component are mechanically correlated within
a progressive tax system, as a positive income shock results in a lower net-of-tax rate.
This means that a valid instrument for the net-of-tax rate is required in order to have
a causal interpretation for ez. Third, non-tax-related changes in potential income also
need to be taken into account. In other words, potential diﬀerential income growth
trends for diﬀerent types of individuals need to be controlled for. We discuss these
issues in more detail in Section 4.
2.2 ETI and income-shifting
It is important to explicitly include income-shifting in the model when analyzing ETI
among individuals with income-shifting opportunities. Especially, business owners have
many diﬀerent channels to withdraw income from their ﬁrm, for example, by reporting
part of their personal taxable income as corporate proﬁts, or vice versa. We present
a static taxable income model for business owners with income-shifting opportunities.
Our model is similar to the elasticity of taxable corporate income model by Devereux
et al. (2014), and the Piketty et al. (2014) ETI model with tax avoidance in the top
income bracket.1
We assume that there are two personal tax bases available, taxable wages zW and
taxable dividends zD. We denote the total taxable income of the owner by zy = zW+zD.
1Other previous papers also consider tax avoidance and income-shifting within the ETI framework,
e.g. Saez (2004) and Chetty (2009).
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This setup generalizes to any two diﬀerently taxed tax bases in which an individual can
report income.
Wages are taxed at a tax rate τW , and dividends are taxed at τD.
2 It is possible for
the owner to legally shift income between the two types of income. This income-shifting
behavior describes the extent of changing the composition of income due to diﬀerences
in τW and τD, while keeping the level of total taxable income constant. Intuitively,
income-shifting from wages to dividends produces more total net income for the owner
if τW > τD. Naturally, the opposite direction for income-shifting holds if τW < τD. If
the tax rates are equal, we are back to the standard ETI model.
For simplicity, let us assume that τW > τD and that both tax rates are exogenous.
The budget constraint can be written as
c = (1− τW )(1− α)zy + (1− τD)αzy (3)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and (1 − α)zy = zW is taxable wages and αzy = zD is taxable
dividends denoted as shares of total taxable income.
The utility function of an owner i is
ui(c, zy, α) = c− θi(zy)− φi(α) (4)
where θi(zy) is the cost of eﬀort to produce total taxable income. φi(α) is the cost of
income-shifting between wages and dividends, i.e. changing the composition of total
taxable income. We assume that the cost of income-shifting depends on the share of
total income reported as dividends. Following Piketty et al. (2014), in order to simplify
the model we assume that the costs functions are separable.
Costs of income-shifting include, for example, the opportunity cost of time or pay-
ments to tax consultants. Income-shifting costs can also be aﬀected by the number of
owners in the ﬁrm, as it might be more burdensome to alter the composition of to-
tal income with multiple owners. In addition, tax-motivated income-shifting can be
considered socially less acceptable.
We assume that both cost functions are convex and increasing in zy and α, respec-
tively. Alternatively, we could assume that both real wages and real dividends have
separate convex cost functions that reﬂect real wage and real dividend income based on
labor supply and eﬀort, and the actual return on invested capital. This type of model
gives qualitatively similar results as the model with one cost function for all income.
In addition, we could assume a distribution of income-shifting costs f(φi), where φi is
2τD includes all corporate taxes paid on distributed dividends.
6
an individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed income-shifting cost which does not depend on α. However,
this does not change the welfare conclusions based on estimated average elasticities (see
Section 2.3).
The owner chooses zy and α to maximize utility, which gives the following ﬁrst-order
conditions:
(1− τW )(1− α) + (1− τD)α = θ′i(zy) (5)
and
(τW − τD)zy = φ′i(α) (6)
Equation (5) implies that when α is ﬁxed, total taxable income is an increasing function
of the net-of-tax rates. Equation (6) implies that when keeping the amount of total
taxable income (zy) ﬁxed, income-shifting is an increasing function of the tax rate dif-
ference. Thus the diﬀerence between the tax rates, (τW − τD), determines the amount
of income shifted from one tax base to another.
Next, we derive elasticities separately for both tax bases. Following Piketty et al.
(2014) and Devereux et al. (2014), keeping (1−τD) constant the average net-of-tax rate
elasticity for wage income is
ezW =
(1− τW )
zW
∂zW
∂(1− τW ) (7)
=
(1− τW )
(1− α)zy
∂zy
∂(1− τW ) (1− α) +
(1− τW )
(1− α)zy
∂(1− α)
∂(1− τW )zy
= eW − e(1−α)
where eW = dzy/zy ∗(1−τW )/d(1−τW ), and e(1−α) = d(1−α)/(1−α)∗(1−τW )/d((1−
τD)− (1− τW )).
Equation (7) implies that we can distinguish the income-shifting eﬀect from the
overall behavioral response ezW . The income-shifting elasticity e(1−α) measures how the
wage tax base reacts to changes in the diﬀerence of the net-of-tax rates. We refer to the
other component eW as the real elasticity. It denotes how total income changes as the
wage tax rate changes, describing changes in real economic activity.
Similarly, we can express the average ETI of dividend income as
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ezd =
(1− τD)
zD
∂zD
∂(1− τD) (8)
=
(1− τD)
αzy
∂zy
∂(1− τD)α+
(1− τD)
αzy
∂α
∂(1− τD)zy
= eD + eα
where eD = dzy/zy ∗ (1− τD)/d(1− τD) is the real dividend elasticity, and eα = dα/α ∗
(1− τD)/d((1− τD)− (1− τW )) is the income-shifting elasticity for dividends.
Next, we present the empirical ETI model with income-shifting. Based on equation
(7), we can write the estimable version of the elasticity of wage income as
4ln(zW )t,i = eW4ln(1− τW )t,i − e(1−α)4(ln(1− τD)− ln(1− τW ))t,i (9)
+4ln(ηW )t,i +4ln(ε)t,i
Compared to the standard ETI model, equation (9) includes the responsiveness of
taxable wage income with respect to income-shifting incentives. Regressing 4ln(zW )t,i
with both 4ln(1 − τW )t,i and 4(ln(1 − τD) − ln(1 − τW ))t,i enables us to estimate
separately both the real elasticity eW and the income-shifting component e(1−α), along
with the associated standard errors. A similar model can also be written for dividend
income. For the sake of brevity, we only present the wage income model.
To empirically identify elasticities eW and e(1−α), we need to assume that real re-
sponses and income-shifting responses are separable. This means that 4(ln(1 − τD) −
ln(1 − τW ))t,i itself or the existence of income-shifting possibilities do not aﬀect real
responses and thus the amount of total income withdrawn from the ﬁrm. Consequently,
income-shifting between tax bases is solely determined by changes in the diﬀerence of the
net-of-tax rates. Without this assumption it is not possible to separate income-shifting
responses from the overall elasticity. Similar assumption is required in separating dif-
ferent elasticities in previous studies (see e.g. Piketty et al. 2014 and le Maire and
Schjerning 2013). In general, the separability assumption is realistic when studying the
eﬀects of changes in tax rates within a tax system that oﬀers income-shifting opportu-
nities both before and after changes in incentives. In our empirical example we study
behavioral responses of Finnish business owners in exactly this type of an environment.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the institutions in more detail.
In our empirical example, it is possible that eW does not capture all potential real
eﬀects among business owners. However, we can take many of these issues into account
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in our analysis. First, we want to exclude all forms of tax avoidance when estimating
eW . Therefore we use gross wage and gross dividend income subject to taxation as
dependent variables when estimating our baseline model. These income measures do
not include potential changes in deduction behavior, which presumably also include
changes in tax avoidance activity (see Doerrenberg et al. 2014). In addition, if personal
income tax rates increase, owners could increase their consumption within the ﬁrm (for
example in the form of more oﬃce amenities or fringe beneﬁts), which is not shown as
changes in income withdrawn from the ﬁrm. Also, if tax rates diﬀer over time, income
can be shifted across periods using retained earnings (see e.g. le Maire and Schjerning
2013). In order to capture these issues, we estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticity of the
turnover of the ﬁrm as an additional analysis. Turnover is less subject to tax avoidance
compared to income withdrawn from the ﬁrm, and it also includes retained earnings and
other income not withdrawn from the ﬁrm in the current period.3
Finally, changes in net-of-tax rates might also aﬀect illegal tax evasion, for example
in the form of intentional underreporting of income. In our model we do not separate
potential evasion responses, and these are thus included in the estimated real response
component eW . More generally, in addition to changes in labor supply and eﬀort, real
responses of business owners might include other types of behavioral margins. For
example, a decrease in the personal income tax rate might increase various types of
investments in the ﬁrm, which might (eventually) increase the total income of the owner.4
Overall, as in the standard ETI model, responses along diﬀerent types of margins of real
responses are all reﬂected in eW .
2.3 Welfare implications
Next, we compare the marginal excess burden in the standard ETI model with a model
that includes income-shifting. Following Chetty (2009), we approximate the marginal
excess burden by comparing behavioral responses caused by a tax rate change to a
benchmark case which ignores behavioral responses. The same follows from assuming
that tax revenue collected from wage and dividend taxes is returned to the owner as a
lump-sum transfer.
We use the following welfare function
3Harju and Kosonen (2013) study the tax responsiveness of turnover among the owners of unincor-
porated ﬁrms in Finland. They ﬁnd small real responses for this group.
4In the ETI model of wage earners investments are generally considered to include investments in
human capital such as education choices and other career considerations. With business owners it is
reasonable to include physical ﬁrm-level investments as well.
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w = {(1− τW )(1− α)zy + (1− τD)αzy − θi(zy)− φi(α)}+ (1− α)zyτW + αzyτD (10)
where individual utility is presented in curly brackets, and tax revenue collected by the
government is denoted as the sum of tax revenue from both tax bases. We again assume
that τW > τD.
Let us ﬁrst consider the standard ETI framework for wage income without income-
shifting opportunities. Conceptually this refers to the simpliﬁed case where α = 0 in
equation (10). The same analysis can be carried out for dividends, but for the sake of
brevity we only show the equations for taxable wage income.
Consider a marginal increase in the wage tax rate, dτW . As the owner is assumed to
optimize her utility, we can use the envelope theorem and denote that the tax increase
has only a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on individual utility. The ﬁrst-order eﬀects of the owner's
utility and the tax revenue of the government cancel each other out. Thus we can write
the excess burden as
dw
dτW
= τW
∂zy
∂τW
= zy
τW
(1− τW )ezW (11)
where ezW denotes the standard ETI. Intuitively, ezW includes all margins of behavioral
responses, and thus deﬁnes the scope of the marginal excess burden of the wage income
tax.
Next, consider a more general case where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and the owner can adjust α.
The excess burden is expressed as
dw
dτW
=
∂zy
∂τW
((1− α)τW + ατD) + zy ∂(1− α)
∂τW
(τW − τD)
=zy
[
(1− α)τW + ατD
(1− τW ) eW + (1− α)
(τW − τD)
(1− τW ) e(1−α)
]
(12)
where eW denotes real elasticity, and e(1−α) is the income-shifting elasticity.
The size of the marginal excess burden in equation (12) depends on the following
factors: (1) the size of the income-shifting elasticity (e(1−α)), (2) the size of the real
elasticity (eW ), (3) the diﬀerence of the net-of-tax rates (τW − τD), (4) the relative size
of the tax bases (α) and (5) the level of both marginal tax rates (τW , τD). Intuitively, a
large e(1−α) relative to eW implies that a large fraction of the overall response is due to
income-shifting. For a given e(1−α), a small (τW − τD) implies that income-shifting has
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only a small eﬀect on eﬃciency, and vice versa. In addition, the relative size of the tax
bases further scales the signiﬁcance of the income-shifting response.
The key diﬀerence between equations (11) and (12) is the income-shifting response.
Assume that we observe an overall decrease in taxable wage income due to an increase
in the wage tax rate, ezW > 0. Assume further that part of this response comes in
the form of income-shifting, e(1−α) > 0, and part of the response is due to changes in
real economic behavior, eW > 0. If we ignore the income-shifting response and use the
standard equation (11) to assess the marginal excess burden, it is approximated to be
too large when 0 < τD < τW < 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Equation (12) shows that income-shifting and real responses have diﬀerent welfare
consequences even within the standard ETI framework when the shifted income is also
taxed. Thus if there are large incentives for income-shifting, equation (12) highlights
that it is important to estimate elasticities for both the real component and the income-
shifting component in order to more accurately analyze the excess burden.
In addition, it is plausible that equation (12) overestimates the welfare eﬀect of
income-shifting. As noted by Chetty (2009), a notable share of costs related to income-
shifting might be payments to tax consultants, who usually report at least part of this
original cost as their own taxable income. Thus the income-shifting costs could include
transfers between diﬀerent agents in the economy, and this ﬁscal externality is not taken
into account in the standard framework. In the extreme, if income-shifting inﬂicts no
real resource costs, the marginal excess burden reduces to the real eﬀect of taxation,
denoted by the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (12). Therefore, even if we
assume that income-shifting itself does not inﬂict welfare costs, it is still important to
separate income-shifting elasticity from the overall ETI to more rigorously study welfare
consequences of income taxation.
3 The Finnish income tax system and recent tax re-
forms
In our empirical example we analyze the owners of privately held corporations in Finland.
Privately held corporations are deﬁned as corporations that are not listed on a public
stock exchange (cf. public or listed corporations). In the Finnish tax system, dividends
from listed and privately owned corporations are taxed at diﬀerent tax rates and under
diﬀerent tax regulations. Also, taxation of privately held corporations is diﬀerent from
that of other types of private businesses (sole proprietors and partnerships).
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Within the Finnish tax system, wage income and dividend income from privately
held corporations are taxed with separate tax rules and tax rates. This creates notable
incentives to arrange the income composition between wages and dividends in such a
way that minimizes tax payments. Owners of these ﬁrms can relatively freely choose
the income composition, and thus income-shifting between these tax bases is in gen-
eral legitimate. For example, reporting more dividend income at the expense of wages
induces no ﬁnes or penalties. Therefore, the owners of privately held corporations pro-
vide a suitable and illustrative example group to analyze both income-shifting and real
responses.
However, there are a few minor legal limitations on whether income is withdrawn
as wages or dividends from a privately held corporation in Finland. Wages cannot be
paid without a work contribution for the ﬁrm, or else wages may be considered as veiled
distribution of proﬁts. Dividends can be paid only if the ﬁrm has distributable assets (for
example accumulated proﬁts and non-tied equity). In contrast to wages and dividends,
other alternatives for withdrawing income from the ﬁrm are restricted. These include,
for example, shareholder loans and share repurchases.5
Next, we describe recent changes in dividend and wage tax rates in Finland for
the owners of privately held corporations. We focus on tax reforms that occurred in
2002-2007, as we use this time period in our baseline analysis.
3.1 Dividend taxation and the dividend tax reform of 2005
Dividend taxation. The Finnish tax system includes speciﬁc rules for dividend taxa-
tion of the owners of privately held businesses. Dividends are categorized into two parts
according to the net assets (assets-liabilities)6 of the ﬁrm:
 The amount of dividends corresponding to an imputed 9% return on the net assets
of the ﬁrm are subject to a ﬂat tax rate (26% in 2007). The imputed rate of return
on net assets is set by the government, and it is the same for all owners.
 Any dividends exceeding the imputed return are taxed progressively (highest rate
56% in 2007).
5As a whole, the Finnish income tax system follows the principle of individual taxation. The income
of a spouse or other family members does not aﬀect the marginal income tax rate of an individual.
However, some tax deductions and social security beneﬁts depend on the total income of the household.
6The net assets of the ﬁrm are calculated using the asset and debt values in the year before. The
net asset share of the owner is calculated based on the ownership share of the ﬁrm. Also, there are
some individual adjustments to the net assets. For example, if the owner or her family members live in
a dwelling which is owned by the ﬁrm, the value of this dwelling is not included in net assets.
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For example, with net assets of 400,000 ¿ and the imputed rate of return set at 9%, the
maximum amount of dividends taxed at the ﬂat tax rate is 36,000¿ (0.09*400,000=36,000).
In other words, any dividends from the ﬁrm up to 36,000 ¿ are taxed at the ﬂat tax
rate. Any dividend income exceeding this amount is taxed according to the progressive
tax rate schedule.
Dividend tax reform of 2005. In general, the reform of 2005 tightened the tax-
ation of dividend income. Before 2005, a full imputation system of corporate taxes
was in place, and dividends were taxed only once at the individual-level. In 2005, the
full imputation system was replaced by partial double taxation of dividends, in which
dividends are in general taxed both at the ﬁrm and individual-level.
In more detail, the reform changed the marginal tax rates (MTR) diﬀerently for
diﬀerent types of owners. In general, changes in the MTR on dividends depend both
on the amount of dividends and the net assets of the ﬁrm. Table 1 presents the main
changes in the MTR on dividends for diﬀerent types of owners. MTR on dividends
includes both individual taxes and corporate taxes paid on withdrawn dividends.
Eﬀective marginal tax rates on dividends (zD)
Before the reform
(2002)
After the reform
(2007)
Type (I): zD ≤ imputed return and zD ≤ 90,000¿ 29% 26%
Type (II): zD ≤ imputed return and zD > 90,000¿ 29% 40.5%
Type (III): zD > imputed return
min 0% 26%
max 55% 54%
Table 1: Eﬀective marginal tax rates on dividends before (2002) and after (2007) the
reform of 2005 for diﬀerent types of owners
The ﬁrst type of owners (Type (I)) in Table 1 are those who have dividend income
below the 9% imputed return on net assets and below 90,000 ¿. For these owners the
eﬀective ﬂat tax rate on dividends decreased from 29% to 26%. Before the reform,
dividends below the imputed return were not subject to the corporate tax rate, and
were taxed only at the ﬂat personal capital income tax rate of 29%. After the reform,
these dividends are only subject to the 26% corporate tax rate, and are not taxed at
all in individual taxation. In other words, dividend income below imputed return and
90,000 ¿ remained single taxed at a ﬂat tax rate.
Type (II) owners are those who have dividend income below the imputed return on
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net assets and above 90,000 ¿. Before the reform, these dividends were taxed at the
ﬂat capital income tax rate. After the reform, 70% of dividends above 90,000 ¿ are
regarded as taxable capital income in personal taxation (28%), in addition to the ﬂat
corporate tax rate of 26%. This results in an eﬀective ﬂat tax rate of 40.5%7 for these
dividends after the reform, compared to 29% before the reform.
Type (III) owners are those who have dividend income above the imputed return
on net assets. Before the reform, these dividends were only taxed as personal earned
income, subject to a progressive tax rate schedule (0-55%). After the reform, 70% of
dividends above the imputed return are regarded as taxable earned income, in addition
to the ﬂat corporate tax rate of 26%. Therefore, the reform signiﬁcantly increased the
MTR on small dividends exceeding the imputed return, but the changes in the MTR
were smaller for large dividends above the imputed return on net assets.
Figure 3 in Appendix A presents the eﬀective marginal tax rates on dividends in
2002 and 2007 with two levels of net assets, 0 and 250,000 ¿ (approximately the average
net assets in the estimation sample before the reform). The Figure shows that most of
the MTR increases occur on low and middle dividend income that exceeds the imputed
return. Also, the Figure shows the 3 percentage point drop in the ﬂat tax rate on
dividends below the imputed return and 90,000 ¿.
In summary, owners with larger ﬁrm-level net assets were more likely to face a
decrease in their dividend tax rate. In contrast, owners with smaller net assets were
more likely to face an increase in their marginal dividend tax rate. Therefore, otherwise
similar owners who diﬀer only in the net assets of the ﬁrm were faced with diﬀerent
changes in their marginal tax rate on dividends.
Finally, the main motivation behind the reform of 2005 was not the economic and
ﬁscal conditions in Finland. The pre-reform full imputation credit was granted only to
domestic shareholders whose ﬁrms operate in Finland. This violated European Union
rules on the equal tax treatment of all EU citizens. Thus Finnish legislators were more
or less forced to change the tax system towards more uniﬁed treatment of domestic
and international shareholders. Therefore, the tax reform of 2005 can be considered
exogenous from the point of view of domestic shareholders.
In addition, the formal proposition of the reform was introduced already in late 2003.
Thus it was possible for owners to anticipate the reform. We discuss the implications of
possible anticipation eﬀects in more detail in Section 4.
7The eﬀective MTR in this case is calculated as 26% + 0.7*(1-0.26)*28% = 40.5%.
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3.2 Wage income taxation and variation in wage tax rates
In Finland, wage income is taxed on a progressive tax rate schedule. There are three
levels of wage income taxes: central government (or state-level) income taxes, munici-
pal income taxes and mandatory social security contributions. The central government
income tax rate schedule is progressive, whereas municipal tax rates and social security
contributions are proportional by nature. Municipal tax rates vary between diﬀerent
municipalities.8 Social security contributions include, for example, unemployment in-
surance payments. In our baseline analysis we exclude employer pension and health
insurance contributions.
During 2002-2007, there was a general decline in central government income tax
rates, and thus marginal tax rates decreased in most income classes. Marginal tax rates
declined more for low and middle wage income, whereas marginal tax rates decreased
only slightly or remained unchanged for higher wage levels. This creates variation in
marginal wage tax rates between diﬀerent types of owners.
Furthermore, municipal tax rates have changed diﬀerently within 2002-2007, which
creates additional variation in marginal wage tax rates. Because diﬀerent municipalities
have changed their tax rates diﬀerently, the marginal wage tax rates of owners with
similar income levels have changed diﬀerently. Also, the municipal tax rate is ﬂat, and
thus municipal tax rate changes are determined only by the municipality of residence,
not by the income level of an individual owner. On average, every ﬁfth municipality
changed its tax rate in each year. Yearly municipal tax rate changes vary from -1 to +1.5
percentage points, which accounts for roughly 1-10% changes in the overall net-of-tax
rate. On average, the municipal tax rate increased from 17.8% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2007.
Figure 4 in Appendix A describes the MTR on wage income. The left-hand side of
the Figure shows that average marginal wage tax rates decreased throughout the income
distribution in 2002-2007, and that the largest changes in average marginal tax rates
occurred at low wage income levels. The right-hand side of Figure 4 shows the actual
marginal tax rates calculated using our data set for the year 2007, highlighting the fact
that individuals with the same income level face diﬀerent marginal tax rates due to
municipal-level tax rate diﬀerences. In addition, owners with the same income level face
diﬀerent changes in the MTR on wages due to diﬀerent changes in municipal tax rates.
Finally, Table 3 in Appendix A presents the marginal tax rates on wages and div-
8There were 416 municipalities in Finland in 2007. Each democratically elected municipal council
decides on the municipal tax rate on an annual basis. Municipalities can choose their tax rates freely.
However, certain legislative municipal-level duties need to be ﬁnanced mainly by municipal taxes (e.g.
basic health care and primary education).
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idends at diﬀerent levels of ﬁrm net assets. The Table highlights that owners with
diﬀerent net assets have diﬀerent MTR on dividends, and faced diﬀerent changes in
marginal tax rates and income-shifting incentives from the 2005 dividend tax reform.
4 Identiﬁcation and data
4.1 Estimable equation
Equation (13) presents our baseline estimable equation for wage income.
4ln(zW )t,i = α0 + eW4ln(1− τW )t,i − e(1−α)4(ln(1− τD)− ln(1− τW ))t,i (13)
+α1f(ln(zW ))t,i + α2Bt,i + α3Ft,i +4εt,i
We estimate the model using a two-stage least squares estimator. 4ln(zW )t,i is the log
change in wage income between t and t+k. ln(1− τW )t,i is the instrumented net-of-tax
rate on wages, and (ln(1− τD)− ln(1− τW ))t,i is the diﬀerence of the instrumented net-
of-tax rates on dividends and wages. Thus eW is the average real elasticity, and e(1−α)
is the income-shifting elasticity. We estimate a similar equation also for dividends.
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), we add a 10-piece base-year wage income spline
f(ln(zW ))t,i to the model. Base-year income controls for unobserved heterogeneity in
income growth. We also control for observed individual characteristics with available
background variables in the tax return data. Matrix Bt,i includes base-year age, age
squared, ownership share of the ﬁrm, and county of residence and gender of the owner.
In addition, ﬁrm-level data allow us to control for ﬁrm-level characteristics. The ﬁrm-
level controls Ft,i include base-year total assets, turnover, proﬁts, industry, number of
employees and county of the ﬁrm.
In our baseline model, we analyze a single diﬀerence between 2002 and 2007. We
choose this time window in order to avoid potential anticipation eﬀects of the 2005 tax
reform. Formal propositions for the dividend tax reform of 2005 were published by the
Finnish Government in late 2003. Also, in 2005, special transition rules were applied.
Therefore, the years right before and right after the reform are not suitable for empirical
analysis that aims at identifying longer-run behavioral parameters (see Kreiner et al.
2014 and 2015). Thus, in our empirical analysis, we exclude the years 2003-2006 from
the regression. In Section 5.2, we perform several robustness checks on the length of the
diﬀerence, including a pooled regression model with multiple diﬀerences.
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As is common procedure in the ETI literature, we focus on intensive margin re-
sponses. We limit the analysis to observations where base-year total income (wages +
dividends) is above 25,000 ¿. In addition, individuals whose absolute change in total
income between 2002 and 2007 is above 50,000 ¿ are dropped from the sample in order
to avoid unnecessarily high inﬂuence by outlier observations. We perform robustness
checks on these sample restrictions in Section 5.2.
4.2 Net-of-tax rate instruments
In a progressive income tax rate schedule, the marginal tax rate increases as taxable
income increases. Therefore, an increase in taxable income mechanically decreases the
net-of-tax rate, causing the tax rate variable to be endogenous in the empirical model.
Thus a valid instrumental variable for the net-of-tax rate is required.
A common strategy in the ETI literature is to simulate predicted (or synthetic)
tax rates and use them as instruments for the net-of-tax rate (NTR) (see Gruber and
Saez 2002). The basic structure of the predicted NTR variable is the following: Take
pre-reform income in base-year t, and use it to predict the net-of-tax rates for t + k
by using the post-reform tax legislation in t + k. The predicted tax rate instrument
is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual NTR in t and the NTR calculated
with income in t and the tax law for t + k. Intuitively, the predicted NTR instrument
describes the change in tax liability caused by changes in tax legislation, ignoring any
behavioral eﬀects via taxable income responses.
We use the Gruber and Saez-type predicted NTR instrument in our baseline analysis.
This instrument is often used in previous ETI studies (see Saez et al. 2012). However,
when studying Finnish business owners, we need to slightly modify the net-of-tax rate
instrument. We need to address the development of net assets when deﬁning the net-of-
tax rate instrument for dividends. Net assets is a key factor in determining the marginal
tax rate on dividends (see Section 3). Average net assets increase in time both in the
whole data set and our estimation sample (See Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A). Thus we
need an estimate for net assets in t+k when deﬁning the NTR instrument for dividends.
Without predicting the net assets, the predicted dividend tax rate change is incorrectly
measured for a large number of owners, and the instrument is too weak and thus invalid.
We predict ﬁrm net assets after the reform for each owner using exogenous pre-
reform characteristics in 2000-2003. We use the same exogenous individual and ﬁrm-
level variables as in the baseline ETI regression. These variables include, for example,
owner-level age, age squared, gender, and ﬁrm-level turnover, total assets and industry
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and location dummies. The R-squared statistic for the net assets prediction using OLS
is 0.73.
An essential issue in identifying ETI is the variation in marginal tax rates. Non-
tax-related changes in income are potentially problematic when identifying the elastic-
ity parameters (see Saez et al. 2012). If the shape of the income distribution varies
independently of tax reforms, the analysis of behavioral responses to tax rate changes
might be biased if this variation cannot be properly taken into account. Non-tax-related
changes in the income distribution are especially problematic if the variation in MTR is
focused only on a certain part of the income distribution, for example the tax rate cuts
or increases in the top income bracket. The fact that both dividend and wage tax rate
variation occurs in all income classes alleviates the potential problems associated with
these issues in our empirical example.
More speciﬁcally, as discussed in the recent ETI literature, there is no proof that
the predicted NTR instrument is exogenous in all cases (see Weber 2014). Especially, if
changes in tax rates are focused on a single part of the income distribution (for example
high-income earners), it is unlikely that the instrument is correlated similarly with both
parts of the transitory income component (εt+k,i − εt,i). However, this is arguably less
of an issue in our empirical example, as changes in the MTR occur across the income
distribution. In addition, the MTR on both dividends and wages also depend on net
assets and the municipality of residence, respectively. To study how the choice of the
instrument aﬀects our estimates, we use alternative instruments to estimate the model
in Section 5.2. Furthermore, we use the bunching method to estimate the standard ETI
without relying on instrumented net-of-tax rates as the source of exogenous variation.
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data are from the Finnish Tax Administration, and include information on the
ﬁnancial statements and tax records of Finnish businesses and their owners. The data
include ﬁrm and owner-level tax record information from the year 2000 onward. The
data include all Finnish businesses (all public and private corporations, partnerships,
sole proprietors etc.). In this study we focus on the main owners of privately held
corporations. The main owner data include only those individuals who received positive
dividends from their ﬁrm during a tax year.
The data set contains all important information for our analysis, for example wages
and dividends paid to the owner by the ﬁrm, and income earned by the owner from
other sources. These, together with other tax record information, enable us to deﬁne the
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marginal tax rates for both wages and dividends. By linking the owner-level and the ﬁrm-
level data together, we can control for various individual and ﬁrm-level characteristics
in the empirical estimation. This type of detailed business owner data are rarely used
in ETI analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A describe the data and the key variables we use from
both 2002 and 2007. Table 4 shows the statistics for the whole data, and Table 5 for
our baseline estimation sample. Owner-level data show that the tax bases of wages
and dividends are of the same magnitude, but the wage tax base is somewhat larger in
our estimation sample in year 2002. In addition, dividends have larger variation than
wages. Firm-level data show that Finnish privately held corporations are relatively small
on average, especially in terms of employees (median number of employees is 4 in 2002).
However, there is considerable variation in terms of the size of the ﬁrm.
Figure 1 describes the means of wage, dividend and total income (wages+dividends)
from 2000 to 2009 for all owners of privately held corporations. Wages, dividends and
total taxable income all increased from 2000 to 2009. The Figure indicates that the
share of wage income relative to total income has increased from 2005 onwards. This
suggests that the tax reform of 2005 and the increase in dividend tax rates aﬀected the
composition of total income, which gives us preliminary evidence that income-shifting
might be signiﬁcant. However, based on Figure 1, it remains unclear whether the tax
rate changes also induced real responses.
In addition, Figure 1 shows that mean dividends increased in the year before 2005,
and decreased right after the implementation of the reform. Plans to the change the
dividend tax system were oﬃcially published already in late 2003. Thus it seems that
owners anticipated the reform by increasing dividend payments before the reform. We
discuss this issue in more detail below.
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Figure 1: Means of wage, dividend and total income withdrawn from the ﬁrm in 2000-
2009, whole data (in 2000 euros)
Next, we describe how tax incentives aﬀect income withdrawn from the ﬁrm. Figure
2 shows the proportional changes in dividends (left-hand side) and total income (right-
hand side) for two groups: those who faced a modest dividend tax decrease or no changes
in the dividend tax rate, and those who faced a dividend tax increase. These groups
are deﬁned based on the predicted changes in marginal tax rates between 2002-2007,
calculated using the income information in 2002. The predicted tax rate changes are
deﬁned similarly as the net-of-tax rate instruments (see Section 4.2 above). Owners
with no changes in the dividend tax rate include those with a predicted change below
7.5% in the tax rate on dividends (in either direction). Owners with a dividend tax
increase include owners with a positive change above 7.5%, and owners with a dividend
tax decrease include owners with a negative change below 7.5% in the predicted marginal
tax rate on dividends.
Figure 2 highlights the following issues: First, dividends and total income increased
very similarly in both groups before 2003. This similarity of pre-reform trends pro-
vides strong visual evidence which supports that our estimation results are not biased
by diﬀerential non-tax related changes in income. This is a crucial assumption when
identifying ETI (see Kleven and Schultz 2014).
Second, when comparing dividends in the pre-reform (2000-2002) and post-reform
(2006-2009) periods, we can see from Figure 2 that dividends decreased among owners
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who faced a predicted dividend tax increase. In comparison, dividends increased among
owners with no tax rate changes or a dividend tax decrease. This indicates that owners
responded to the dividend tax reform according to changes in tax incentives. In addition,
compared to owners with no tax changes or a dividend tax decrease, owners with a
dividend tax increase decreased their total income after the reform. This implies that
the dividend tax reform also aﬀected the total income withdrawn from the ﬁrm, which
alludes to changes in real economic behavior.
In the Figure, the light-gray dashed lines denote the potential anticipation period
(2003-2005). A tax committee appointed by the government published a report in 2002
which proposed a full double taxation of dividends. This proposal would have increased
dividend taxes among almost all owners. However, the oﬃcial government proposal
published in late 2003 introduced only partial double taxation of dividend income, which
increased dividend taxes only for part of the owners. Furthermore, special transition
rules were applied in 2005 which reduced the double taxation of dividends.
Figure 2 shows that both groups increased dividends before the reform in 2003 and
2004. Increase in dividends in 2003 in both groups is feasible based on the double
taxation proposal in the committee report published in 2002. In 2004, larger dividend
payments among the group that faced a dividend tax increase is consistent with antici-
pation incentives. However, based on the oﬃcial proposal published in 2003, the group
that faced a modest predicted dividend tax decrease or no changes in the dividend tax
rate should have not increased dividends in 2004 based on pure tax incentives. Never-
theless, there are logical reasons to explain this behavior. First, approximately 2/3 of
ﬁrms decided on the amount of dividend distributions for 2004 before the publication of
the oﬃcial proposal in late 2003. Thus an average increase in dividends for all owners is
in line with anticipation incentives based on the 2002 committee report. Second, heated
public discussion on dividend taxation and the change in the composition of the govern-
ment after the parliament election in 2003 potentially induced additional uncertainty on
the implementation of the dividend tax reform of 2005.
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Notes: Figure shows proportional changes in dividends and total income (wages+dividends) over time for our
baseline estimation sample. The group with no change or a dividend tax decrease includes owners with no
changes in the predicted dividend tax rate (changes below 7.5% in either direction) between 2002-2007, and
owners with a predicted decrease in the dividend tax rate below 7.5%. The group with a dividend tax increase
includes owners with a predicted increase in the dividend tax rate above 7.5%. The predicted changes in tax
rates are calculated similarly as the net-of-tax rate instruments in Section 4.2.
Figure 2: Proportional changes in dividends and total income for owners with diﬀerent
predicted changes in the dividend tax rate
Figure 5 in Appendix A presents similar graphical evidence for wage income. Figure
5 shows the proportional changes in wages (left-hand side) and total income (right-hand
side) for those who faced a wage tax increase or no changes in the wage tax rate, and
those who faced a wage tax decrease. As before, the groups are deﬁned based on the
predicted wage tax rate change between 2002-2007. Owners with no changes in the wage
tax rate include those with a change below 7.5% in the predicted tax rate on wages (in
either direction). Owners with a wage tax increase include owners with a predicted
positive change above 7.5%, and owners with a wage tax decrease include owners with
a negative change below 7.5% in the predicted wage tax rate.
First, Figure 5 shows that wages and total income increased very similarly in both
groups before 2003, which is essential for identiﬁcation. This again implies evidence
of common income development before the large change in dividend tax rates. Sec-
ond, wage income decreased in the anticipation period in both groups. This suggests
that increased dividends before the reform were at least partly oﬀset by lowering wage
payments, indicating active income-shifting among the owners. Third, comparing pre-
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reform and post-reform periods, the Figure shows no diﬀerential changes in wages or
total income between the groups. This indicates that wage tax rate changes do not
induce signiﬁcant changes in the wage tax base and total income.
Figure 6 in Appendix A presents graphical evidence of how dividends and wages
respond to changes in income-shifting incentives for two groups: those who faced no
changes or a decrease in the diﬀerence of wage and dividend tax rates (τW − τD) and
those who faced an increase in the diﬀerence of the tax rates. Again, the groups are
deﬁned based on predicted tax rate changes. Owners with no changes in tax incentives
include those with a change below 10% in the tax rate diﬀerence (in either direction).
Owners with an increase in the diﬀerence include owners with a positive change above
10%, and owners with a decrease include owners with a negative change below 10% in
(τW − τD).
Figure 6 again shows similar income trends before the dividend tax reform in both
groups. When comparing pre-reform and post-reform periods, the Figure shows clear
evidence that tax bases respond to income-shifting incentives. For dividends, the owners
who faced an increase in (τW−τD) decreased their dividend payments compared to other
owners. To highlight the income-shifting eﬀect, the same owners mutually increased their
wage payments relative to owners with a decrease or no changes in (τW − τD).
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Table 2 presents the baseline ETI estimates for wage income and dividend income for
a single diﬀerence between 2002-2007 using equation (13). Columns (1)-(2) show the
results for dividends, and columns (3)-(4) present wage income elasticities with the full
set of control variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnZD lnZD lnZW lnZW
ln(1− tD) 1.709*** 0.615**
(0.125) (0.292)
ln(1− tW ) -0.159 -0.279
(0.313) (0.306)
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )] 1.432*** -0.366***
(0.370) (0.141)
1st stage F-test for ln(1− tD) 1,766.65 907.76
1st stage F-test for ln(1− tW ) 391.19 227.62
1st stage F-test for
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )]
504.02 487.66
Observations 14,006 14,006 12,137 12,137
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Equation (13) estimated using a single diﬀerence between 2002-2007 and the baseline estimation sample (see
Section 4.1). All columns include income splines, and owner and ﬁrm-level base-year controls. Table includes
the ﬁrst-stage F-tests for all the instruments used in columns (1)-(4).
Table 2: ETI estimates for wages and dividends
For dividends (zD), the standard ETI model in column (1) gives average net-of-tax
rate elasticity of 1.7, which can be considered large. In order to separate the income-
shifting component from the overall ETI, we add the diﬀerence of the net-of-tax rates
on dividends and wages to the model. The results show that a signiﬁcant part of the
overall response of dividends is due to income-shifting between the tax bases. Column
(2) shows that the average income-shifting elasticity (e(1−α) in equation (13)) is 1.4 and
statistically signiﬁcant. The estimate for the real response component (eW in equation
(13)) is 0.6 and weakly signiﬁcant. This suggests that income-shifting does not fully
explain the changes in the dividend tax base.
For wages (zW ), the standard ETI estimate in column (3) is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero. In column (4), we include the diﬀerence of the net-of-tax rates to the model.
The results show that the income-shifting elasticity is -0.4 and statistically signiﬁcant.
However, the real response component is statistically insigniﬁcant. These results imply
that the wage tax base is only responsive to income-shifting incentives.9
What do the results imply in terms of the excess burden analysis? Applying the
welfare loss formulas (11) and (12) presented in Section 2.3, we can approximate the
marginal excess burden both in the standard ETI framework and the income-shifting
model. We approximate the marginal excess burden using elasticities in Table 2, and
9All F-test statistics are very large, which implies that the instruments are strong. The diﬀerence
between the number of observations in columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) is due to fact that some of the owners
do not withdraw wage income from the ﬁrm. As a robustness check we also estimate the wage income
model including owners with zero wages (see Table 8 in Appendix A). Including these owners do not
aﬀect the results.
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the average marginal tax rates on dividend income and wage income using post-reform
values for the whole data set (see Table 4 in Appendix A).
Using the standard ETI framework and the point estimate for the average overall
dividend elasticity in column (1) of Table 2, we approximate the marginal excess burden
of dividend taxation to be around 0.9. When separating the income-shifting eﬀect and
using the average estimates in column (2) of Table 2, the marginal excess burden halves
to 0.4. Thus the standard ETI analysis for the dividend tax base notably overestimates
the deadweight loss, and simply taking into account the fact that the shifted income
is also taxed signiﬁcantly decreases the evaluated eﬃciency loss. Furthermore, if we
assume that income-shifting is purely transferring resources in the economy with zero
social costs, the marginal excess burden of dividend taxes reduces to the welfare loss
induced solely by the real response component. Using the estimate for real responses
in the dividend tax base model in column (2) of Table 2, we approximate the marginal
deadweight loss to be around 0.3 which is three times smaller than in the standard ETI
model.
For wages, zero real responses imply that potential welfare losses are induced only by
income-shifting responses (column (4)). In addition, if we assume that income-shifting
does not aﬀect excess burden, the welfare eﬀects for the wage tax base are negligible.
Therefore, in our empirical example, the only non-negligible welfare eﬀects stem from
dividend taxes and the dividend tax base.
Furthermore, an important observation that emerges from the results is that the
dividend tax base seems to be more responsive to tax rate changes than the wage tax
base, both at real and income-shifting margins. In theory, we have no explicit reason
to assume symmetric real responses between diﬀerent tax bases or tax rates (Piketty et
al. 2014). First, the return on invested income (dividends) could be inherently more
elastic than the compensation for working (wages). This would imply that dividends
are simply more responsive to tax rate changes than wages. In addition, there are few
practical diﬀerences between the two tax bases. Decisions on dividend distributions are
usually made only once or a few times within a year. In contrast, wages are normally
paid on a monthly or weekly basis. The more infrequent nature of the decision-making
process might make dividend income more responsive to taxes.
The results in Table 2 also indicate that owners respond to the dividend tax rate,
but do not respond to the wage tax rate. First, dividends respond actively to changes
in the dividend tax rate (column (1)). However, column (2) shows that a large part
of the overall eﬀect comes from income-shifting between dividends and wages. Instead,
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column (3) shows that changes in the wage tax rate do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the wage
tax base. However, column (4) shows that income-shifting incentives signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the wage tax base, which implies that changes in the dividend tax rate aﬀect the size of
the wage tax base through the income-shifting channel.
In our empirical setting, there are also institutional and practical reasons explaining
diﬀerent responses to diﬀerent tax rates. First, within the time period we study, the
variation in marginal tax rates is larger for dividends, both over time and between
income tax brackets. If there are underlying optimization frictions, the owners would
respond more to larger changes in tax rates (see Chetty 2012 and Kleven and Schultz
2014), and thus respond more to dividend tax rate changes. Second, the owners might
be more aware of their dividend tax rates, as long as they are aware of the net assets
of their ﬁrm. In contrast, the eﬀective marginal wage tax rate schedule including many
deductions and tax credits might be less transparent. Previous literature suggests that
individuals respond more actively to more salient taxes (Chetty et al. 2009). As an
additional analysis in Section 5.2, we use cross-sectional variation and the bunching
method as an alternative identiﬁcation approach, and show that owners respond actively
to dividend taxes but do not respond to wage taxes, which support the results in Table
2.
In addition, Table 2 shows that income-shifting elasticities are clearly signiﬁcant for
both tax bases, which implies that income-shifting is an important behavioral margin
explaining observed changes in both tax bases. However, the estimated elasticity coef-
ﬁcients diﬀer from each other. In contrast to real responses, we have no clear reason to
assume asymmetric income-shifting responses between the two tax bases. However, it is
diﬃcult to comprehensively compare the estimated coeﬃcients from diﬀerent tax bases
with each other. First, in our estimation sample the wage tax base is 30% larger than
the dividend tax base in the base year (see Table 5 in Appendix A). This explains part
of the observed asymmetry between the income-shifting elasticity coeﬃcients. Taking
the diﬀerence of the size of the tax bases into account decreases the income-shifting
elasticity for the dividend tax base to approximately 1. Second, the relatively large vari-
ation in the income-shifting elasticity for the dividend tax base makes the comparison
of the point estimates more diﬃcult, especially after taking into account the diﬀerent
sizes of the tax bases. Third, in our example, we have arguably less exogenous variation
in the wage tax rate compared to the dividend tax rate. This could potentially further
complicate the empirical comparison. Related to this, we study the robustness of the
results in terms of instruments and other model speciﬁcations in Section 5.2.
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In summary, the results in Table 2 show that income-shifting largely explains the
behavioral responses of business owners in Finland. Income-shifting elasticity is notable
and statistically signiﬁcant for both tax bases, and accounts for a remarkable share of
the overall response. In the Finnish context, the large income-shifting response is not
surprising. Among business owners, income-shifting between wages and dividends is
relatively unlimited and straightforward, which implies that the costs of income-shifting
are arguably small. In addition, evidence from other countries also point to large income-
shifting responses among similar types of individuals with income-shifting possibilities,
see for example Slemrod (1995), Gordon and Slemrod (2000) and Saez (2004) for the
US, Devereux et al. (2014) for the UK, and le Maire and Schjerning (2013) and Kreiner
et al. (2014) for Denmark.
Finally, the results highlight that the distinction between income-shifting and real
elasticity components can have substantial eﬀect on the evaluated excess burden of in-
come taxation. In general, separating diﬀerent tax avoidance responses from the overall
ETI of high-income earners or business owners can largely aﬀect policy conclusions.
Our approach is applicable for many existing income tax systems. For example, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US drastically decreased marginal personal tax rates
of high-income earners, and induced notable incentives to shift income from the corpo-
rate tax base to the personal tax base. Previous studies show that the overall ETI is
relatively large among high-income earners in the US, implying notable welfare losses
(see for example Saez et al. 2012). Nevertheless, with separate real and income-shifting
elasticities, we could better understand the welfare eﬀects of reducing personal income
tax rates among top income earners in the US.
5.2 Additional analysis and robustness checks
As a ﬁrst additional analysis, we study bunching at the kink points of the dividend and
wage tax rate schedules. The bunching method provides a visual and robust method to
analyze ETI. If individuals respond to tax rates, we should observe individuals bunching
at the kink points of the piecewise linear income tax rate schedule. Empirical estimates
of excess bunching can be used to evaluate ETI locally at the kink points (Saez 2010).
The bunching method provides a local alternative to our baseline model, and allows us
to estimate behavioral responses using cross-sectional variation in tax rates. This avoids
some of the critical issues in ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimation and net-of-tax rate instruments,
such as non-tax-related changes in income over time. We describe the bunching method
in more detail in Appendix B.
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The bunching method identiﬁes the eﬀect of the increase in the marginal tax rate
close to the kink, not taking into account potential changes in behavior elsewhere in the
income distribution or in other tax bases. Therefore, the standard bunching approach
does not enable us to identify separate estimates for real and income-shifting responses.
Nevertheless, similar overall behavioral responses from the bunching analysis would
support our main results based on panel data regressions.
Figure 7 in Appendix B shows the distributions of dividend income around the kink
point of ﬂat-taxed dividends in 2002 and 2007. Dividend income below this kink is
taxed at the ﬂat tax rate. Dividends exceeding the kink are taxed progressively. Thus
for many owners, the ﬂat-tax kink point induces large changes in the marginal tax rate
on dividends. On average, the increase in the marginal tax rate on dividends at the kink
is 13 percentage points in 2002, and 19 percentage points in 2007.
The Figure indicates clear bunching at the ﬂat-tax kink point. A large proportion of
the owners are located very close to or exactly at the kink point. This strongly supports
the earlier conclusion that owners are responsive to marginal tax rates on dividends, and
that the dividend tax base is clearly responsive to the marginal tax rate on dividends.
We approximate the local ETI of dividend income at the kink point using the average
marginal tax rate above the kink for owners within the bunching window. We estimate
the ETI to be around 0.9 and statistically signiﬁcant both in 2002 and 2007.
Figure 8 in Appendix B presents the distributions of wage income (earned income)
relative to diﬀerent kink points in the marginal wage tax rate schedule for 2002 and
2007. The Figure shows that there is no statistically signiﬁcant excess bunching at
the kink points. The evidence from the wage tax rate kink points suggests that own-
ers do not react actively to marginal wage tax rates, which is in line with negligible
wage elasticity estimates presented before. Compared to the ﬁrst-diﬀerences analysis,
the cross-sectional bunching approach is not sensitive to the size of the change in the
marginal tax rate between t and t+k. As changes in wage tax rates over time have been
modest in 2002-2007, this might aﬀect the results in Section 5.1. Nevertheless, both of
these methods suggest low responsiveness of wage income to the marginal tax rate on
wages.
In summary, the bunching analysis supports the result that dividends are more re-
sponsive to tax rates than wages. We ﬁnd clear bunching at the ﬂat-tax kink point for
dividends, whereas the wage tax rate schedule appears not to induce any behavioral
responses. However, studying excess bunching does not give explicit information on the
extent of income-shifting between the tax bases. Nevertheless, given the ample possibili-
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ties to shift income between wages and dividends in this context, it is very probable that
part of the observed excess bunching is due to income-shifting between the tax bases,
as highlighted in our baseline panel data analysis.
As discussed in Section 2.2, studying only wage and dividend tax bases might under-
estimate potential eﬀects of income taxes on real economic behavior of business owners.
Therefore, as a second additional analysis, we study the responsiveness of ﬁrm turnover
to changes in individual income tax rates. In contrast to income withdrawn from the
ﬁrm, changes in turnover also capture potential changes in within-ﬁrm consumption such
as fringe beneﬁts, and changes in retained earnings and other income not withdrawn from
the ﬁrm in the current period. We interpret average changes in turnover to reﬂect the
real eﬀort of the owner, as the ﬁrms in our estimation sample are relatively small in
terms of the number of employees (median no. of employees is 3 in 2007). Thus the
owner typically contributes signiﬁcantly to the overall output of the ﬁrm. In addition,
elasticities of these types of ﬁrm-level income components with respect to owner-level
tax rates are rarely analyzed in public ﬁnance literature (see Harju and Kosonen 2013).
Table 6 in Appendix A presents the results for the turnover estimation. The results
show that wage tax rate has no eﬀect on turnover, which supports the earlier conclusion
that wage taxation has a negligible eﬀect on real economic behavior in our example. The
point estimate for the dividend net-of-tax rate implies a positive relation to real economic
behavior, but the estimate is only weakly signiﬁcant (p-value 0.109). Nevertheless, this
result is broadly in line with the notion that dividend taxes could also have a real
economic eﬀect on the behavior of business owners.10
Next, we study the robustness of our baseline results with respect to the length of
the diﬀerence and the net-of-tax rate instruments. First, columns (1) and (2) of Table 7
in Appendix A show the results for a regression that uses pooled seven-year diﬀerences
(2000-2007, 2001-2008 and 2002-2009) to estimate our baseline equation (13). A pooled
regression approach allows us to better control for potential observed heterogeneity in
income growth between diﬀerent types of owners. In this speciﬁcation, real responses
are insigniﬁcant both for dividends and wages. Furthermore, the point estimate for the
income-shifting component in the dividend model is somewhat smaller (1.03) than in
our baseline model, but it is still notable and highly signiﬁcant. The point estimate for
income-shifting in the wage model remains practically unchanged (-0.39). This suggests
10It is worth noting that the size of the income component might also aﬀect the interpretation of the
estimates. As the underlying tax rate variation is the same as before, broader income components have
smaller elasticities if the absolute behavioral response is the same for diﬀerent income components.
Therefore, it is presumable to receive smaller point estimates for the turnover of the ﬁrm than for
diﬀerent types of income withdrawn from the ﬁrm, such as wages and dividends.
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that part of the diﬀerence between the income-shifting elasticity estimates in the baseline
wage and dividend models could be accounted for by taking potential heterogeneity in
income growth more rigorously into account.
Second, columns (3)-(6) of Table 7 in Appendix A present the results for 6-year
and 7-year single diﬀerences. The results for 2002-2008 are very similar to our baseline
model. However, for 2002-2009, the point estimates in the dividend model somewhat
decrease, but not in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. Overall, the estimates for longer
time periods imply qualitatively very similar results as our baseline model, and thus
support the view that income-shifting is the principal behavioral margin for the owners
of privately held corporations in Finland.
As discussed in Section 4.2, the commonly applied Gruber-Saez net-of-tax rate in-
strument is not necessarily exogenous (see Weber 2014). Since the instrument is a
function of base-year income, it is unlikely that the instrument is uncorrelated with the
transitory income component (εt+k,i−εt,i). This issue is pronounced if tax rate variation
occurs only at certain income levels, as it is likely that transitory income shocks diﬀer
between individuals at diﬀerent income levels in the base-year. In our empirical exam-
ple, endogeneity of the instrument could be a particular concern in the wage income
model, as part of the wage tax rate variation come from changes in central government
income tax rates that are a function of taxable income in the base-year.
First, we derive the net-of-tax rate instrument using lagged income in period t− 1.
As shown in Weber (2014), using income lagged for one or more periods when predicting
changes in the net-of-tax rates reduces the potential endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate
instrument. However, the disadvantage is that this type of strategy typically generates
weaker instruments, which might decrease the validity of the instrument.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 7 in Appendix A show the results for our baseline
model when using the Weber instrument. The results highlight that the strength of this
instrument is a major concern in our empirical setup, as the ﬁrst stage F-test statistics
decrease signiﬁcantly and are all below 20. It is reasonable that lagged instruments
perform worse particularly for business owners, as yearly income tend to ﬂuctuate more
among them compared to regular wage earners. Nevertheless, given the weakness of the
instrument, the point estimates still suggest that income-shifting is the main source of
behavioral responses. Compared to our baseline results, the income-shifting elasticity
is very similar in both the wage and dividend tax base, but the estimates are very
imprecise.
Second, we use changes in the proportional municipal tax rate as an instrument
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for the overall changes in the progressive marginal wage tax rates of the owners. The
municipal tax rate is ﬂat, and therefore not determined by individual income. This
provides the basis for the exogeneity of this instrument and justiﬁes the use of this part
of the variation as exogenous changes in tax rates in the ETI model. Matikka (2014)
discusses the pros and cons of this approach and applies changes in municipal tax rates
as instruments when estimating ETI for the overall population in Finland.
Columns (9) and (10) of Table 7 in Appendix A show the results when using the
municipal tax rate instrument. In general, the estimates are much more imprecise than
in our baseline model. First, changes in municipal tax rates are on average rather small
(see Section 3.2), which tends to increase imprecision. Second, in our context, the share
of tax rate variation captured by the municipality instrument decreases along with a
longer length of the diﬀerence, and our baseline ﬁve-year diﬀerence is too long in order
to get more precise results when using this instrument. Third, our data do not include
municipal-level characteristics, which might not only decrease standard errors but also
further validate the exogeneity of municipal-level changes as individual-level instruments
(see Matikka 2014). Nevertheless, the results point to similar conclusions as before, but
the only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect comes from the income-shifting response in the
wage tax base model.
Overall, despite the obvious issues related to alternative instruments, the results
when using diﬀerent instruments still suggest that income-shifting is the principle source
of responses. Furthermore, potentially more exogenous instruments for the wage tax
rate tend to increase the income-shifting elasticity in the wage income model, which
tentatively suggests that at least part of the observed asymmetry between the income-
shifting elasticities of the two tax bases in our baseline model could come from the
shortage of exogenous variation in the wage tax rate.
In addition, we estimate several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of our baseline estimable
equation (13) in order to assess the robustness and sensitivity of the results. The results
for these estimations are presented in Table 8 in Appendix A. In general, our main
conclusions are robust to changes in the empirical speciﬁcation.
In column (1) of Table 8 we estimate the baseline models without any control vari-
ables. The results without controls are approximately similar to those with controls in
the dividend model. This indirectly indicates that (observed) non-tax-related changes in
income do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. In other words, identiﬁcation appears not
be sensitive to the selected individual and ﬁrm-level controls.11 However, the estimates
11As an additional robustness check, we add 10-piece splines of ﬁrm-level income and asset variables
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in the wage income model are more sensitive to added controls. This suggests that it
is important to control for non-tax-related changes in wage income using available ﬁrm
and owner-level characteristics.
Columns (2)-(5) of Table 8 show the results with diﬀerent variations of income cut-
oﬀs. All of these results are statistically equivalent to our baseline model. However, the
point estimates vary somewhat depending on the income cut-oﬀs, which suggests that
there is some heterogeneity in responses.
Column (6) of Table 8 presents our baseline estimates weighted by total income
withdrawn from the ﬁrm by the owner. In many ETI studies, estimates are weighted
by income to reﬂect the relative contribution to tax revenue (Gruber and Saez 2002).
The results show that weighted estimates are very similar to the unweighted baseline
estimates in our empirical example.
In our baseline analysis, we do not include ﬁrm-level mandatory pension insurance
contributions in the wage tax rate. Column (7) of Table 8 presents the results when
mandatory ﬁrm-level pension insurance contributions are included. There is only small
variation in contribution rates over time and between diﬀerent owners. Therefore, in-
cluding pension contributions mainly aﬀect the level of the wage tax rate. The results
show that including pension insurance contributions have no eﬀect on the coeﬃcients
in the wage income model. However, for dividends, including pension contributions ap-
pears to increase the relative share of real elasticity from the overall response, but the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant compared to our baseline model.
Our data only include owners with positive dividend income. Thus in the data there
are some owners with no wage income withdrawn from the ﬁrm. Column (8) of Table
8 estimates the wage income model including owners with zero wages by replacing zero
wages with annual wages equal to 1 euro. Including owners with zero wages do not aﬀect
the results.12
Finally, columns (9) and (10) of Table 8 present the OLS and reduced-form results,
respectively. OLS results indicate that the negative mechanical correlation between in-
come and the net-of-tax rates is notable, as the OLS estimations give counterintuitive
in order to more rigorously control for the possibility that changes in individual income and ﬁrm-level
characteristics are connected. This might be a concern because ﬁrm net assets, which also reﬂect the
size of the ﬁrm, greatly aﬀect changes in the marginal tax rates on dividends. However, adding ﬁrm-
level splines does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. Nevertheless, adding additional splines increases
precision.
12In general, the owners who do not pay any dividends and are thus not included in our data might
respond diﬀerently to tax incentives than the owners who pay dividends. Therefore, our results might
not fully reﬂect the average responses of all Finnish business owners. For example, it is plausible that
owners not paying any dividends are less active in income-shifting, especially before the reform of 2005
when there was in general larger incentives to pay dividends.
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results with large negative own net-of-tax rate elasticities. Reduced-form results imply
that the predicted changes in net-of-tax rates based on pre-reform characteristics aﬀect
income-shifting behavior in both the wage and dividend income models and real eco-
nomic responses in the dividend model. Thus these results are in line with the baseline
two-stage least squares model.
6 Discussion
In this paper we distinguish between real responses and tax-motivated income-shifting
between tax bases. We present a model that enables us to separate the income-shifting
response from the overall ETI. We show that separating income-shifting responses can
have substantial eﬀect on welfare analysis and policy conclusions. This type of approach
is applicable for many existing tax systems which include opportunities to shift income
between diﬀerent tax bases.
As an empirical example, we analyze real responses and income-shifting between
wages and dividends among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland. Ample
possibilities for income-shifting together with diﬀerential variation in tax incentives make
this group an interesting example to study the eﬀects of both real income creation and
income-shifting. Our results show that income-shifting is clearly signiﬁcant and accounts
for a large proportion of the overall behavioral response among Finnish business owners.
Using the estimated elasticities, we show that the evaluated excess burden of dividend
taxation is approximately three times smaller when we separate the income-shifting
response.
Our results emphasize that it is crucial to distinguish between diﬀerent behavioral
margins when analyzing the eﬀects of income taxes among high-income earners and busi-
ness owners, as large observed overall responses do not necessarily yield large eﬃciency
eﬀects. Furthermore, separating diﬀerent types of responses have implications for prac-
tical tax policy. Real responses stemming from deeper behavioral parameters such as
labor-leisure preferences are not under direct government control (Piketty et al. 2014).
In contrast, income-shifting can be governed more easily by re-designing the details of
the tax system. Therefore, for example, limiting the legal possibilities to shift income
arguably decreases the overall ETI among individuals with income-shifting possibilities.
However, compared to real economic responses, decreasing the income-shifting elasticity
has a notably smaller eﬀect on excess burden.
Finally, it could be that the opportunity to decrease the overall personal tax burden
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through income-shifting between diﬀerent tax bases increases the economic activity of
high-income earners and business owners in the long run. If this type of eﬀect exists,
the policy maker would need to balance between tax revenue losses induced by income-
shifting and the long-run eﬃciency gains induced by setting diﬀerential tax rates and
allowing for income-shifting. In future research, it would be important to gain knowledge
of the potential profound eﬀect of income-shifting on real economic activity in order to
comprehensively understand the welfare eﬀects of income tax systems.
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Notes: Figure shows the marginal tax rates (MTR) on dividends for a single owner of a privately held
corporation with no ﬁrm-level net assets (left-hand side), and with net assets of 250,000 euros (right-hand
side) for years 2002 and 2007. For simplicity, wage income is assumed to be zero. MTR on dividends includes
corporate taxes paid on withdrawn dividends (after 2005) and all automatic deductions and allowances on
dividend income. Dividends exceeding the imputed return on net assets include central government taxes and
average municipal taxes.
Figure 3: Average marginal tax rates on dividends in 2002 and 2007. No net assets
(left-hand side), net assets of 250,000 ¿ (right-hand side)
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Left-hand side: Figure shows the average marginal tax rates (MTR) on wage income in 2002 and 2007 for
an owner of a privately held corporation. For simplicity, dividend income is assumed zero. MTR includes
central government taxes, average municipal taxes and all automatic tax deductions and exemptions. MTR
also includes social security contributions levied on wage income and ﬁrm-level social security contributions.
MTR on wages does not include pension and health insurance contributions or any deductions based on
insurance contributions. Right-hand side: Figure shows the marginal tax rates (MTR) on wage income
including individual municipal tax rates from the whole data. For simplicity, dividend income is assumed
zero. MTR includes central government taxes, individual municipal taxes and individual tax deductions and
exemptions. MTR also includes social security contributions levied on wage income and ﬁrm-level social
security contributions. MTR on wages does not include pension and health insurance contributions or any
deductions based on insurance contributions.
Figure 4: Average marginal tax rates on wages in 2002 and 2007 (left-hand side).
Marginal tax rates on wages in 2007, including individual variation in the municipal
tax rate (right-hand side)
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MTR on wages MTR on
dividends (no
net assets)
MTR on
dividends (net
assets 250k)
MTR on
dividends (net
assets 1,000k)
MTR on
dividends (net
assets 5,000k)
Income 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
5,000 18.1 11.6 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
10,000 23.9 17.0 19.3 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
15,000 37.4 32.6 36.3 36.6 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
20,000 43.4 32.6 42.3 41.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
25,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 0 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
30,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 23.1 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
35,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 19.3 36.2 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
40,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 36.3 41.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
45,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
50,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
55,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
60,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
65,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
70,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
75,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
80,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
85,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
90,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 32.3 29.0 40.5
95,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 35.1 29.0 40.5
100,000 56.4 54.8 55.3 52.8 55.3 53.2 23.1 36.2 29.0 40.5
Notes: Table presents the marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends in 2002 and 2007 for a single
owner of a privately held corporation with diﬀerent values of ﬁrm net assets (0, 250,000, 1,000,000 and
5,000,000 euros). MTR on wages is calculated with dividend income equal to zero, and vice versa. MTR on
wages include average municipal taxes, central government income taxes, automatic tax deductions and tax
credits and average ﬁrm-level social security contributions (3%). MTR on wages does not include pension
and health insurance contributions or any deductions based on insurance contributions. MTR on dividends
include corporate taxes on withdrawn dividends (after 2005). MTR on dividends include all automatic tax
deductions and tax credits. MTR on dividends exceeding the imputed return on net assets include average
municipal taxes and central government income taxes.
Table 3: Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends with diﬀerent levels of ﬁrm
net assets, 2002 and 2007 (in nominal euros)
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2002 2007
Owner-level characteristics
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Wages 25,860 21,305 34,687 39,104 30,779 25,615 40,962 52,045
Dividends 25,696 8,750 101,722 39,104 22,015 7,523 83,456 52,045
Total income 51,556 35,242 110,043 39,104 52,798 38,458 95,632 52,045
MTR dividends 0.38 0.37 0.11 39,104 0.36 0.26 0.11 52,045
MTR wages 0.47 0.51 0.11 39,104 0.42 0.47 0.13 52,045
Ownership share 0.80 0.70 0.35 39,104 0.73 0.80 0.27 52,045
Male 0.82 1 0.38 39,104 0.82 1 0.38 52,045
Age 48.47 49 10.46 39,104 50.42 51 10.78 52,045
Firm-level characteristics
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Turnover 1,022,725 232,099 5,847,782 39,104 1,064,023 224,399 8,153,712 52,045
Total assets 697,755 167,336 4,410,689 39,104 855,857 196,591 6,140,952 52,045
Net assets 431,001 93,075 3,836,671 39,104 524,072 108,413 4,034,409 52,045
No. of employees 10.74 3 47.76 39,104 9.74 3 51.52 52,045
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, whole data (in 2002 euros)
2002 2007
Owner-level characteristics
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Wages 27,302 25,000 21,208 14,010 28,992 26,546 24,237 14,010
Dividends 21,026 11,301 32,882 14,010 22,251 11,878 33,858 14,010
Total income 48,328 40,738 38,153 14,010 51,243 44,050 41,118 14,010
MTR dividends 0.40 .42 0.10 14,010 0.37 0.26 0.11 14,010
MTR wages 0.48 0.51 0.09 14,010 0.43 0.47 0.12 14,010
Ownership share 0.77 0.80 1.02 14,010 0.76 0.85 0.26 14,010
Male 0.84 1 0.37 14,010 0.84 1 0.37 14,010
Age 47.4 48 9.28 14,010 52.4 53 9.27 14,010
Firm-level characteristics
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Turnover 764,243 265,622 2,652,620 14,010 852,451 267,531 2,732,651 14,010
Total assets 453,014 190,734 1,686,850 14,010 650,201 250,470 2,612,920 14,010
Net assets 268,201 113,133 837,243 14,010 399,598 154,933 1,634,324 14,010
No. of employees 8.91 4 21.32 14,010 8.84 3 23.21 14,010
Table 5: Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (in 2002 euros)
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Notes: Figure shows the proportional changes in wages and total income (wages+dividends) over time for our
baseline estimation sample. The group with no change or a wage tax increase includes owners with no changes
in the predicted wage tax rate (changes below 7.5% in either direction) between 2002-2007, and owners with
a predicted increase in the wage tax rate above 7.5%. The group with a wage tax decrease includes owners
with a predicted decrease in the wage tax rate below 7.5%. The predicted changes in tax rates are calculated
similarly as the net-of-tax rate instruments in Section 4.2.
Figure 5: Proportional changes in wages and total income for owners with diﬀerent
predicted changes in the wage tax rate
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Notes: Figure shows the proportional changes in dividends and wages over time for our baseline estimation
sample. The group with no change or a decrease in the diﬀerence of the tax rates (τW − τD) includes owners
with changes below 10% in either direction between 2002-2007, and owners with a predicted decrease in the
diﬀerence below 10%. The group with an increase in (τW − τD) includes owners with a predicted increase in
the tax rate diﬀerence above 10%. The predicted changes in tax rates are calculated similarly as the net-of-tax
rate instruments in Section 4.2.
Figure 6: Proportional changes in dividends and wages for owners with diﬀerent pre-
dicted changes in the diﬀerence of the marginal tax rates on wages and dividends
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VARIABLES ln(turnover)
ln(1− tW ) -0.062
(0.378)
ln(1− tD) 0.303
(0.189)
1st stage F-test
for ln(1− tW )
245.27
1st stage F-test
for ln(1− tD)
859.46
Observations 13,021
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Equation (13) estimated using our baseline estimation sample of owners and a single diﬀerence between 2002-
2007, and log changes in ﬁrm-level turnover as the dependent variable. Explanatory variables are log changes
in instrumented net-of-tax rates on wages and dividends. Control variables are the same as in the baseline
equation, and include income splines, owner-level base-year controls and ﬁrm-level base year controls.
Table 6: Alternative real response estimation: The elasticity of the turnover of the ﬁrm
with respect to changes in net-of-tax rates on wages and dividends
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Appendix B
Bunching at kink points
Following Saez (2010), consider a small increase in the marginal tax rate, dτ , at a point
z = k. Below the kink point k taxable income z is taxed at a tax rate τ1, and above the
kink point the tax rate is τ2, such that τ1 < τ2. Assuming individuals with standard
preferences as before in Section 2, we can denote the fraction of individuals bunching
as B(dz) =
´ k+dz
k
h0(z)dz, where h0(z) is the pre-reform smooth density function of
taxable income. Individuals located within the income interval (k, k+dz) before the tax
rate change bunch at k due to the introduction of the kink point. Individuals further up
in the income distribution z > k + dz or below k do not move to the kink point. Saez
(2010) shows that the local ETI is proportional to the excess density mass around the
kink point
e w b(k)
k ∗ ln((1− τ1)/(1− τ2)) (14)
where b(k) = B(dz)/h0(k) is the excess mass at k.
Empirically, the excess mass at the kink point is estimated by comparing the actual
density around the kink point to a smooth counterfactual density. The counterfactual
density describes how the income distribution at the kink would have looked without a
change in the tax rate. Due to imperfect control and uncertainty about the exact amount
of income in each year, the usual approach is to use a bunching window around k to
estimate the excess mass (see Saez 2010 and Chetty et al. 2011). In other words, we
compare the density of taxpayers within an income interval (k−δ, k+δ) to an estimated
counterfactual density within the same income range.
We use the approach of Chetty et al. (2011) and estimate the counterfactual density
non-parametrically. To do this, we ﬁt a ﬂexible polynomial function to the observed
density function, excluding the region around the kink point [k − δ, k + δ] from the
regression. First, we group individuals into small income bins, and estimate a regression
of the following form
cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i +
k+δ∑
i=k−δ
ηi · 1(zj = i) + εj (15)
where cj is the count of individuals in bin j, and zj denotes the income level in bin
j. The order of the polynomial is denoted by p. The counterfactual density function
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is estimated by omitting the bunching window from the regression, cˆj =
∑p
i=0 βi(zj)
i.
Thus we can express bunching around k as Bˆ =
∑k+δ
i=k−δ(cj − cˆj).
Finally, the excess mass is calculated as
bˆ(k) =
Bˆ∑k+δ
i=k−δ cˆj/(2δ + 1)
(16)
As in earlier literature, parameters δ and p are determined visually and based on the
ﬁt of the model. We use a seventh-order polynomial and a bunching window of +/-700
¿ from the kink point in our baseline estimations. Our conclusions are not sensitive to
the choice of the bunching window δ or the degree of the polynomial p.
As in Chetty et al. (2011), standard errors for bˆ(k) are calculated using a boot-
strap procedure where we generate a large number of income distributions by randomly
resampling the residuals from equation (15). The standard errors are deﬁned as the
standard deviation in the distribution of bˆ(k).
Figure 7 shows the distributions of dividend income around the kink point of ﬂat-
taxed dividends in 2002 and 2007. The Figure presents dividend income relative to
the kink for each owner within +/- 5,000 ¿ of the kink in bins of 100 ¿. Dividend
income below the kink is taxed at the ﬂat tax rate. Dividends exceeding the kink
are taxed progressively. Thus for many owners, the ﬂat-tax kink point induces large
changes in the marginal tax rate on dividends. On average, the increase in the MTR on
dividends at the kink is 13 percentage points in 2002, and 19 percentage points in 2007.
A large proportion of the owners are located very close to or exactly at the kink point.
We approximate the local ETI of dividend income at the kink point using the average
marginal tax rate above the kink for owners within the bunching window. We estimate
the ETI to be 0.9 and statistically signiﬁcant both in 2002 and 2007.
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Figure 7: Dividend income distribution around the ﬂat-tax rate kink point, years 2007
(left) and 2002 (right)
There are few aspects that are worth noting when interpreting Figure 7. First, the
ﬂat-tax kink point is not the same for all owners in terms of euros, as the amount
corresponding to the 9% imputed return on the net assets of the ﬁrm obviously varies
among diﬀerent owners. However, Figure 7 implies that owners are very aware of their
individual kink points, as there is no other explicit reason to locate at the kink except
the discontinuous change in the marginal tax rate. Second, the size of the change in
the marginal tax rate on dividends at the kink point also varies among owners, as
the marginal tax rate on dividends exceeding the kink depends on the total sum of
progressively taxed income (wages and earned income from other sources).
We conduct an indirect bunching analysis for wages by studying the distribution of
progressively taxed earned income around the kink points of central government income
tax rate schedule.13 The exact location in the taxable income distribution is what
matters in terms of bunching at kink points. Thus it is not relevant to analyze only the
distribution of wages from the ﬁrm, as other progressively taxed income also aﬀects the
13Central government income tax rate schedule includes various kink points (in total 5 in 2002 and
4 in 2007). Small amounts of earned income are not taxed by the central government. The ﬁrst kink
appears at a point where the central government tax rate ﬁrst applies. Various kink points are associated
with marginal tax rate increases between 4-12 percentage points. At the ﬁrst income threshold, there is
a clear increase in the marginal tax rate. In addition to the ﬁrst kink point, the last kink involves the
most distinctive increase in the tax rate. Changes in the eﬀective marginal tax rates around the ﬁrst,
third and last kink point of the central government tax rate schedule in 2002 and 2007 are presented in
Figure 8.
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location of the owner in the taxable income distribution. However, in our analysis we
only include owners who do not receive wages or other earned income outside their ﬁrm.
Nevertheless, the results are similar when we include all owners in the data.
Figure 8 presents the distributions of earned income relative to diﬀerent kink points
in the marginal tax rate schedule for 2002 and 2007 (+/- 5,000 ¿ in bins of 200 ¿). The
Figure shows that there is no statistically signiﬁcant excess bunching at the kink points
of the earned income tax rate schedule. The Figure presents only 3 kink points in both
years, but the result of no signiﬁcant bunching holds for all kink points.
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Figure 8: Taxable earned income distributions relative to diﬀerent kink points in bins
of 200 ¿, years 2002 (above) and 2007 (below)
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